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I Will There Be a Science of Law in the Twenty-First Century ?* 
ABSTRACT 
RICHARD STITH, J.D., Ph. D. 
Professor of Law, Valparaiso University 
Indiana 
n e  skepticism of the American 
Legal Realists and their heirs 
threatens to make a politically 
neutral science of law impossible 
and thus to undermine the liberal 
polity which needs such a science. 
Ronald Dworkin attempts to refute 
the skeptics and defend both legal 
theory and liberalism. However, 
the author points out, Dworkin 
and liberalism are themelves 
skeptics when it cornes to moral 
principles, and, therefore, they 
cannot wholly escape from similar 
skepticism with regard to legal 
principles. Both Anglo-American 
and Continental legal history are 
Le scepticisme des théoriciens de 
l'école réaliste américaine et de 
leurs disciples compromet 
l'élaboration d'une science 
juridique non partisane,et, par 
conséquent, menace E'Etat libéral 
qui a besoin de cette science. 
Ronald Dworkin tente de réfuter 
les arguments des sceptiques et 
vient à la défense tant du 
libéralisme que de la théorie du 
droit. Toutefois, l'auteur souligne 
que Dworkin et la pensée libérale 
font eumêmes preuve de 
scepticisme à l'égard des valeurs 
morales et ne peuvent donc s é n  
départir entièrement à l'égard des 
* This essay is a revised versionof a lecture originally delivered in Spanish tu the Tenth 
Conference on the General Science of Law, held November 4, 1988, in Vaiparaiso, Chile, 
on the topic "The Science of Law in theTwenty-First Century". ïhat  lecture was later published 
in Chile in En el Umbrul del Sig10 XXI (EDEVAL, 1989) and reprint4 in Spain in 12-13 
Cuademos infomrivos de Derecho Hisrbrico Publico, Procesal, y de In Nuvegucibn 3009 
(1990). Because its perspective is that of a U.S. law professor addressing Civil Law scholars, 
the essay may be of particular interest to the readership of this review. 
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examined in the course of these principes juridiques. C'est dans ce 
arguments. contexte qu'il examine l'évolution 
tant du droit anglo-américain que 
du droit continental. 
With recent U.S. academic debates in mind, 1 would like to 
discuss the impact of contemporary skepticism on the possibility of a 
"science of law", understood in the European sense of systematic 
knowledge of a set of legal norms. 1 first present what appears to me to be 
the strongest argument in favor of skepticism. 1 then tum to the response 
of the well-known North American scholar Ronald Dworkin, who tries to 
refute the skeptics and to show the possibility of such knowledge - albeit 
in a form quite different from that usually found in the Romano-Germanic 
world. Finally, 1 present my own reasons for remaining somewhat skeptical. 
Already in the last century the American jurist Oliver Wendel1 
Holmes, Jr. argued that a judge is often not bound by legal norms, because 
these either are quite vague or else are contradictory. Law has no conceptual 
uNty knowable by a legal science, being merely a prediction of what such 
unfettered judges are likely to say in the future. Holmes' followers (many 
of whom were influenced by the nascent social sciences) founded in the 
1920's and 30's the American school cailed "Legal Realism," and gave new 
impetus to the thesis that "the law is no more than what the judges Say it 
is". Some in this school came to affirm that legal niles never, or almost 
never, decide cases and that, on the contrary, it is political and psychological 
factors that are decisive for the judge. Consequently, they wished to 
exchange the traditional methods of legai research and teaching for those 
of the new social sciences.' They hoped, indeed, to have many sciences 
about law ; but they denied the possibility of a science of law. There cannot 
be systematic knowledge of a set of unrelated particulars. 
In point of fact the Legal Realists were highly successful: 
Although in the last centuly Americans, as well as Europeans, spoke often 
about "Legal Science", today these words would be incomprehensible to 
a U.S. law student. 
One of the best Realist arguments in favor of the lack of coherence 
(and so also of comprehensibility) of the body of legal mles was based on 
the existence of dissenting opinions. Even the wisest judges often disagree 
on what the law requires in a given case. But if these jurists have not made 
a mistake of fact or of logic, their disagreement would appear to prove that 
the law can dictate contradictory conclusions with equal facility and, 
therefore, cannot be intemally coherent. Nor can it be authoritative, for if 
1. See, for example, the classic work by Jerome FRANK, Law and the Modern Mind, 
Brentano's Inc.. 1930. 
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the law requires two opposite holdings, then it requires neither, and cannot 
decide the case in point. 
Those early Realists were not revolutionaries, just simple 
pragmatic progressives who wished to release judges from the then-dominant 
mechanical conceptualism, so that they could be free to confront pressing 
societal problems. The Realists did not which to abolish law but to use it 
as an instmment to further their own social values. However, in recent years 
in the United States a new school has arisen which seeks to draw much more 
radical conclusions from the Realist theses. This school calls itself the 
"Critical Legal Studies Movement". In his Knowledge and poli tic^,^ and 
l elsewhere, the genius of the movement, Roberto Mangebeira Unger 
(Brazilian, today professor at Harvard Law School) argues that the Realist 
critique is incompatible with the liberal polity as we know it. 
Liberalism, according to Unger, is an idwlogy requiring a law 
that is coherent, complete, and neutral with regard to politics and morals. 
It wishes to leave open as large a field of action as possible to individual 
l interests by restricting law to a set of dry d e s  of the game. In order to promote private planning, the common good must be reduced to a minimum 
and specified in advance. Such a political project is much aided by a moral 
skepticism and subjectivism that wams the judge not to let any personal (read 
"private") normative ideals influence his or her legal judgments. 
The fact of moral pluralism seems to confirm and strengthen such 
a vision of the mle of law. For if persons of equal intelligence have different 
moral opinions, it seems that there must be no accessible morality that is 
objective or otherwise universally valid. And in a world without credible 
shared values, people must rely more than ever on the public d e s  of law. 
In Europe and in many parts of the New World, these demands of liberalism 
led in the nineteenth century to codification, while in the U.S. other equally 
conceptualist forms emerged - such as that of a coherent, neutral, and 
binding set of case precedents (the doctrine of stare decisis). Both sides of 
the Atlantic claimed that "Legal Science" was now possible. 
But now Legal Realism cornes along to say that mles of law do 
1 
not exist, or at least that they do not decide cases. Moreover, Realism points 
to disagreement about law as a proof of legal subjectivity in a way exactly 
parallel to liheralism's use of disagreement about morals as a proof of moral 
subjectivity. What decides cases, according to the Realists, are the private 
beliefs of the judge; these are imposed ex post facto on parties in 
disagreement with him or her. Thus the neutral point above morals and 
politics, needed by liberalism, is destroyed hy the Realist critique. What 
Europeans tend to cal1 " the crisis of statutory law" is in reality a crisis for 
al1 law and for liberalism itself. Critical Legal Studies people are pleased 
2. New York, New York, The Free Press, a division of  Macmillan hblkhing Co., 
1975, 2nd edition 1984. 
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with this tum of events, for they wish to finish up with liberal society, in 
order to construct new communities of types still largely unspecified. 
Dworkin's anti-Realist response is based in part upon an earlier 
distinction made by H.L.A. Hart in his The Concept of Law,3 that 
conceming points of view "intemal" and "external" to law. Hart teaches 
that every properly legal affirmation is made from a perspective that takes 
as given the obligation to play the legal game - that is, is made from a 
perspective "intemal" to law. Only someone intemal can Say "one must 
pay this tax" or "one is obligated to report an accident". Somwne external 
to law can only describe the opinions of those who are intemal, saying, for 
example, "most judges think that you have an obligation to pay taxes and 
report accidents". That is, the intemal person can make nomative legal 
affirmations while the external person cannot go beyond sociological 
description. 
Confronted, then, with the Realist thesis and proffered proof of 
legal incoherence, Dworkin in Taking Rights S e n o ~ s l y , ~  and in Law's 
E m ~ i r e , ~  insists that law appears so only from an extemal viewpoint. He 
challenges the Realist sociologist to sit down on the judicial bench and see 
with his or her own eyes whether there is not in fact a best answer for nearly 
every legal case or problem, even if other judges on that bench are often 
in disagreement, Dworkin says that Our skeptic will end up finding the 
answer which seems to be legally most appropriate, and not imposing his 
or her own private preferences as to morality - even though moral ideas 
will certainly influence this result, a fact that Dworkin does not deny. It is 
only from the outside, from the point of view of someone not committed 
to playing the legal game, that one can conclude from the fact of 
disagreement among judges that the relevant law is incoherent. On the 
inside, one may discover that some judges are simply mistaken, despite their 
intelligence and good will - with the proviso, of course, that one may 
oneself be the one mistaken and, therefore, that one must retain an open mind 
on the matter.6 In this way, Dworkin is able to reaffirm the possibility of 
a science of law - at least in the sense of a legal theory that may be 
redeveloped by each judge, if not in the more enduring sense to which 
Europeans have aspired. 
1 would say that Dworkin has a good argument here. The Realists 
were in fact quite enamored with the emerging social sciences and with the 1 
3. Oxford, England, Clarendon Press (Oxford University Prcss), 1961, 2nd edition, 
1972. 
4. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1978. 
5. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Bel Knapp Press (Harvard University Press), 1986. 
6. A similar argument has been made by John FINNIS, in Narural LW and Narural 
Righrs, Oxford, England, Clarendon Press, (Oxford University Press), 1980, with regard 
to the objectivity of basic moral and natural law judgments. 
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goal of a purely factual, non-normative description of law as it "really" is.7 
But without assuming a purpose, a telos, there cannot be coherence or 
theory, so it is no wonder that these would-be sociologists found none. 
What is that finality which ordinarily provides coherence to the 
mles of law? There is only one purpose which can be universally ascribed 
to al1 those internal to law and therefore can offer help to an all-embracing 
Legal Science: the will to be bound, the will to submit, the will to obey the 
law. Whatever its ulterior motivation may be, it is this will or aim which 
makes one "intemal" to the law in Hart's sense and makes possible 
Dworkin's discovery of legal unity. For if the law is to control, it cannot 
contain antinomies. One cannot obey two contradictory masters (the truth 
in Hans Kelsen's early opposition to "pluralism"). The Realists and their 
Critical heirs do not disagree with these assertions. By holding that the law 
contains contradictions, they destroy its binding power in logic and in effect. 
But it is then also the case that if one begins with a commitment to legal 
authority, to the binding quality of law, one cannot fail to presuppose its 
latent unity. And given this presupposition, and sufficient time and good 
will, a judge will almost always be able to fmd some non-contradicted 
principle in law and legal tradition which is able to resolve the case in point, 
without (self-consciously at least) imposing his or her personal moral or 
political beliefs. 
Such a judicial guest is not quixotic. Zfthe law has authority, it 
must contain a manifest or hidden unity . The Realists can mock the search 
for systematic legal theory only by committing themselves in advance to an 
anti-authontarian posture - not by pointing to any correct empirical 
description of the world. Dworkin is right from the internal point of view, 
and they are right from the extemal point of view. But the choice of point 
of view can be determined neither by positive law nor by fact. 
This is not first time in history that such conflicts and 
misunderstandings have arisen. The mos juris gallicus (the French Humanist 
school of Roman Law study) made similar criticisms of the anterior mos juris 
italicus (the approach of the Glossators and Commentators who first 
expounded rediscovered Roman Law to their students in Bologna). The 
French ridiculed the Italians for believing in the unity of Roman Law instead 
of seeing it from an historicist perspective, as merely a collection of often 
unrelateci and contradictory statements uttered over a thousand or more years 
of Roman civilization. But of what possible use could the French perspective 
have b e n  to the professors of Bologna who were attempting to explain the 
content of a living system of law, authoritative at least for those subject to 
the Holy Roman Empire? A collection of unprincipled and possibly 
contradictory mles cannot decide conmete cases. (It is worth noting that even 
7. An excellent historical summary of the relationships between Legal Realism and the 
new sciences of society can be found in Edward PURCELL, Ir., 7he Crisis of Dernocrorir 
Reoiy, Lexington, Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, 1973. 
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in France itself, while many scholars followed the French school, judges and 
lawyers stayed with the Italian). 
Thus a seeming paradox: From the practical imperative to decide 
cases according to an authority comes the theoretical effort to develop a 
Legal Science. Practical duty requires theoretical science. Sociologists of 
law can look with contempt upon the theory of law only if they do not care 
about the practice of law. 
In saving legal theory, Dworkin claims also to save liberalism. 
He shows that, even in difficult and controversial cases, good judges do not 
seek to impose their own wills or private opinions, but rather to develop their 
distinct visions of what the law is in itself. They are making judgments, not 
imposing personal preferences. Thus there need be nothing unfair or 
arbitrary in a judge's conclusion that the law comes down on one side of 
a case, even if many colleagues might think it settles on the other side. It 
is possible for us to go on with that belief, essential to liùeralism, that the 
judge is bound and lirnited by the law, even when he or she has recourse 
to controversial legal theory. Dworkin rescues liberalism from the 
skepticism which threatened to destroy it, by permitting us once again to 
stand united as a cornmunity in search of the latent coherence we suppose 
to be present in the norms which govern us. 
For me, however, a central problem remains. Liùeralism must 
at the same time reject and incorporate skepticism about noms. It must reject 
skepticism on the legal plane, because it needs to affirm the existence of a 
determinative set of mles ovemding the personal and particular values of 
each judge. But is requires skepticism on the moral plane, in order to treat 
al1 non-legal noms  as private and subjective, and thus to avoid the revival 
of a natural law which might justify additional resirictions on individual 
liberties and interests. Dworkin himself holds that human equality and 
respect for other persons excludes any attempt to use state power to impose 
a moral concept of the good life on those not in agreement with that concept. 
Such an imposition, he says, would unfairly use the state to advance the 
preferences of some over others. But then why is it not also unfair and a 
lack of respect for a judge to impose on others a controversial decision of 
law? 
Dworkin defends the judge by pointing out that the judge does 
not knowingly impose anything personal to himself or herself when deciding 
a controversial case: It would indeed be unfair and disrespectful for one to 
impose a preference because if is one's own on others, but it is not wrong 
for one to impose one's best judgment concerning the meaning of a law 
binding all. However, in the moral realrn, too, most of us do not imagine 
ourselves to be expressing merely our private feelings or personal 
preferences. In al1 humility, we make an effort to render an opinion 
concerning what is really the best way to live together. To impose that view 
on others may be a mistake, but it is surely not a favoring of ourselves nor 
a disrespect for those others. 
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Dworkin cannot have it both ways. He cannot be a skeptic with 
regard to morality and a believer with regard to law, for it is the same doubt 
that assails, and the same faith that strengthens, the one as the other. Either 
the fact of disagreement reduces normative judgments to private preferences 
or it does not. But whatever it does, it does the same both to law and to 
morality. 
One way to understand these tensions in Dworkin's work would 
be this: Dworkin is seeking to discover the fundamental principles that 
undergird liberal politics and law. He correctly observes that in adopting and 
enforcing a particular view of those ultimate grounds, one is not favoring 
oneself but rather one is impersonally favoring what one supposes to be the 
best answers. Nevertheless, this very process leads him to an ultimate liberal 
premise which states that al1 ideas of the good are to be treated as personal 
preferences. In other words, the content of liberal theory contradicts the 
process by which it must be understood and affirmed. It is not Dworkin 
himself who is inconsistent. Rather, he has revealed an inconsistency in the 
body of thought which he is so profoundly examining. 
Liberalism itself contains an antinomy that prevents it from 
silencing the skepticism of the heirs of Reaiism, the radicals in the Critical 
Legal Studies Movement. Liberalism needs skepticism to liberate ifself from 
traditionai moral beliefs and to raise the banner of law as the sole object of 
public loyalty. But that same skepticism tums law into the private preference 
of each judge. We must choose: either we give up on neutral legal theory, 
or we give up on liberalism and begin to speak as seriously about morality 
as we do about law. And no matter which we choose, "Legal Science" 
becomes a daunting task. 
